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Abstraksi
Pertanyaan sentral artikel ini membahas tentang gerakan 
fundamentalisme liberal yang beroperasi dan membentuk keasyikan 
kita saat ini dengan terorisme dan intrik koneksinya untuk menerima 
Islam. Banyak argumen yang diusulkan mengacu pada pemikiran 
politik pasca-fondasionalis yang memfokuskan inti perhatiannya 
pada cara di mana Islam secara luas dianggap sebagai ancaman 
kekuatan untuk tatanan liberal dan keamanan global. Dibanding 
berfokus pada pelaku teroris atau aktivis muslim radikal, artikel 
ini secara radikal mengambil rute yang berbeda dalam membuat 
pikiran praktis hegemonik dari konstruksi terorisme kontemporer. 
Tesis tulisan ini menyebutkan bahwa Islam adalah target utama 
wacana mengenai terorisme saat ini. Fundamentalisme liberal telah 
berupaya untuk mereorientalisasi Islam melalui perang dan proyek 
global dari de-radikalisasi. Yang dipertaruhkan dalam wacana ini 
adalah hubungan antara Islam, politik dan kekerasan.
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Pengantar
“If you harbor terrorist, you are terrorist; if you aid and abet terrorist, 
you are terrorist—and you’ll be treated like one!” These words represent 
the rhetoric of today’s liberal power that masks its banality through the 
language of victimhood and moral-ideological supremacy altogether. 
Bush has proclaimed that the war on terror is justifi ed war of retaliation not 
only againts Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida but also againts the supposed 
threatening forces to ‘humanity’. Osama and those labelled as terrorist are 
posited with evil power that needs to be made intelligible through war 
and torture. One decade of invasion in Afganistan and Iraq has shaped 
discourse on global terrorism to the extent that American unilateralism is 
perceived as worth global support. It is precisely a$ er having a% ained its 
status as moral discourse that it authorises killing of thousand civilians 
in the two wars, in Iraq 2003 and Afganistan 2001-present. Such atrocity 
is justifi ed within Just War doctrine as ‘collateral damage’—morally 
tolerable death as unintended eff ect of war misconduct.
As well-informed public, we know too well that rhetoric of power 
seeks to win support instead of telling the truth of its own crime. However 
beautiful and morally engaging the rhetoric may appear, it cannot stand 
the test of time and human conscience. How could people around the 
world be fooled a$ er they have seen and read atrocities caused by the war 
on terrorism in Middle East? 
This article takes seriously the maneuver of liberal fundamentalism 
as it operates in the current discourse on terrorism. We need to push our 
discussion into the core problematics of the war and all its accompanying 
ideological interventions such as global project of deradicalization and 
disengagement. Our fundamental question is what is actually the enemy 
evil the war on terror implies? How best to make sense of the connection 
between Islam and terrorism as implicated in the discourse? This is not 
an easy task. 
To deal with ideological question means First all to study how 
ideological masking of facts and ideological construction of knowledge of 
objects (i.e terroris, radical community, Islamist) set unquestioned grounds 
and causes for killing moslems and intervening into internal aff airs of their 
religious conduct. This articles argues that it is within current discourse 
on terrorism that Islam, instead of terrorism, is the targe% ed enemy of 
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liberal fundamentalism. War on terrorism serves particular interests of the 
Western power, be it economic or political, which all articulate through 
this discourse. Equipped with the diff erence between terrorist act and 
terrorism, we become more enligntened to speak of ‘terrorism’ as part of 
orientalist agenda that remains alive since colonial period. 
First section, From Political to Religious Terroris, discusses the 
shi$ ing understanding of contemporary terrorism from political to 
religious characterizing. The shi$ , as found abudantly in terrorism 
studies in post 9/11, hints not only at the failure to grasp the more complex 
characteristics of current use of unpredictable yet terror infl icted violence 
but also the dramatic intrusion of orientalist prescriptions into academic 
world particularly research centers to which grants for researchs are 
mostly provided by liberal regimes and transnational corporations whose 
interests with Islam and Middle East are at stake. Second section, Inspecting 
the Oriental Specters, presents international debates on terrorism since 
1970s.  It is through this process that the connection between Islam and 
terrorist’s violence through the globalising rhetoric of Islamist radicalism 
has steadily developed. Lack of consensus on the defi nition of terrorism 
for the Dra$  Convention on International Terrorism paves the ways for 
the trend. Third, Reorientalising Islam, elucidates main arguments of this 
essay by drawing upon post-foundationalist thoughts on contemporary 
terrorism. Central hypothes is twofold. First, Islam is reorientalised 
through discourse on terrorism as it feeds the liberal search for order and 
security. Second, Islam is perceived as the invisibility of threateing evil, 
with which liberal identitarian logic of politics is rendered workable.  
From Political to Religious Terrorism
It might be of some truth that the greater success of terrorist’s act 
is when the sense of ultimate terror predominates over those targeted 
livings. Political scholars on terrorism are completely aware of how 
the terrorist instrumentalizes the victims in order to achieve far greater 
objective, be it encouraging the sense of distrust among the public 
againts their goverments for its failure of maintaining security—strategic 
manipulation (Bell, 1978:50; Laquer, 2001:26), or the modest one, that is, 
inciting pressure againts the targeted community-state to be in compliance 
with their demand—coercive manipulation (Wilkinson, 2001:46). Most 
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Vol. 14, Nomor 2, November 2010
250
of the scholars focusing on political violence seems to share one central 
thesis that terrorism is specifi c strategy in confl ict context to pursue one’s 
interest and to justify one’s cause as well. 
Taking into account political nature of the confl ict, terrorism 
as tactic or method is no longer the previlege of the weak, particularly 
non-state actors, but extends to include tactics employed by the states 
to terrorize their sovereign enemies in inter-state confl ict or insurgent 
groups either through direct military a% ack or by proxy (Schmid, 1988: 
201). In Palestine-Israel confl ict, for quick instance, suicide bombing 
commited by Palestinians might be labelled as terrorist act and such 
labelling could be equally a% ributable to Israel’s military a% acks on Gaza 
Strip or West Bank as they sought to contain and destroy Hamas and its 
bases. What scholars on political violence suggest is that terrorism is an 
act of compellence, as summarized in the Sun Tzu’s slogan—kill one and 
frighten ten thousand. 
Contextualizing terrorism as instrumental violence has been the 
main feature of discourse on terrorism during Cold War period, particularly 
in 1970an-late 1990s (Neuman, 2008:77). The goals pursued through terrorist 
act are perceived as politically a% ainable and technologies of violence 
deployed are relatively moderate in terms of inducing human atrocities. 
Drawn upon a number of cases since the end of ninetenth century, two 
scholars on terrorism, Weinberg and Eubank in their widely quoted book, 
What is Terrorism (2006), classify modern terrorism into four waves.1 First 
Wave characterises terrorist acts since the end of ninetenth century until 
First World War. Second Wave is the feature of terrorist acts in the context 
of anti-colonialism and the birth of post-colonial nationalism a$ er Second 
World War toward the late 1960s. Third Wave began in the late 1960s until 
1980s in which terrorist acts were situated in anti-capitalism movement 
and anti-war movement together with heated US-Soviet contestation. 
Fourth Wave, situated simultenously with Iran Revolution 1978-1979 and 
1 Not diff erent from Weinberg’s context-based typology of terrorism, Paul Smith 
(2007:17-40) emphasises ideological dimension of modern terrorism  and classifi es it 
into 3 waves: First, Anarchist/Revolutionary Terror; Second, Anti-colonialist/Nationalist 
Terror; and Third, Religious Terrorism.
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growing wave of jihadism in Afganistan against communist Soviet 1979-
1989, characterises terrorist acts with religious motives and goals.2
The First three waves accentuate political nature of the confl ict in 
which terrorism deployed as strategy and termed as Poltical Terrorism, 
while the fourth wave, with Islam perceived as its main proponent, is 
called Religious Terrorism. In this last wave, terrorism, its violent terror, 
no longer serves political goals. Violence is perceived as the ultimate 
goal of the homicide. Phenomenon of suicide bombing is taken for 
granted to inform the validity of such thesis. Violence for the sake of 
violent redemption becomes the defi ning nature of religious terrorism. 
In contrast to the common slogan of political terrorism noted above, 
religious terrorism imbues homicidal acts with ‘thousand dead, thousand 
witnesses”; killing as many people as possible is its ultimate goal (Perrin 
and Negrin, 2008:4-5). Among other declaratory sentences quoted by 
proponents of fourth wave is the statement issud by Ayatollah Baqer 
Al-Sadr: “We are not fi ghting so the enemy recognizes us and off ers us 
something. We are fi ghting to wipe out the enemy”. Mesmerized with 
these seemingly apocalyptic words, another notorious scholar, Bruce 
Hoff man (2006:90), advances his argument that terrorist’act, like suicide 
bombing, presents trancendental act of reedeming one’s sinful life and 
simultaneously demolishing evil that inhabits the body and soul of the 
enemies. 
Though remaining discriminate in targe% ing the victims, some 
scholars argue that the potential victims are less clear or poorly identifi able 
largely because this type of terrorism derives its strength and causes 
from human encounter with God or worse, his personal or collective 
2 For further reading on the fourth wave terrorism, see studies undertaken by academic 
proponents of ‘Religious Terrorism’ as follows: David Cook. Understanding Jihad. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005; Barry Cooper. New Political Religions, 
or An Analysis of Modern Terrorism. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004; 
Beverley Milton-Edwards. Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945.New York: Routledge, 
2005; Thomas Mockaitis. Osama bin Laden: A Biography. California: Greenwood, 2010; 
Eli Berman. Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2009
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coping with the changing world.3 Though easily invalidated if we take 
up Osama’s political project, which is completely mundane and refl ecting 
nexus of power-relations in Middle East context,4 most of the fourth wave 
proponents goes far beyond Huntington’s thesis on clash of civilizations. 
Suicide bombers that hĳ acked two civilian airplanes, exploded WTC 
and killing 3000,  are perceived as the blind servant of ‘radical islamist 
ideology’ whose genealogy must be sought in clandestine movement 
such as Al-Qaida and the likes. It follows that in responding to Bush-style 
rhetorics ‘why do they hate us?” the answers must reside in the terrorist’s 
religious ideology, homeland and community that all, arguably, breed 
3 Understanding causes of terrorism as rooted in human subject’s encounter with 
the world and outer world characterises behavioralist and culturalist perspectives. 
Some scholars, particularly proponents of root cause thesis, argue that the terrorist are 
“cultural outcast, living at the margin of society in either their countries of origin or 
their host countries” (Roy, 2006:159-170). Concerning 9/11 terrorists, they are seen more 
likely as product of “westernized Islam than traditional Middle East politics. Beside 
as eff ect of de-culturation, terrorist, or terrorism, is seen as eff ect of secularization, as 
ways to cope with rootlessness and disembeddedness (Lara, 2003:186-193). Economic 
disparity, authoritarian regime, defi cit-surplus democracy are also seen as root cause 
of terrorism—structuralist perspectives.
4 The following are publicly declared goals of Jihadism as listed from Osama’s speeches: 
(1) fi ghting the great satan and its collaborators—US and repressive regimes in Middle 
East; (2) Expelling US from Iraq; (3) establishing an Iraqi Islamic Emirate as a prelude 
to joining wider caliphate; (4) extending the jihad to secular states surrounding Iraq; 
(5) clashing with Israel; (6) combating secularism. These offi  cial goals, however, refl ect 
political dimensions of Middle East-Western Powers confl ict that US in particular does 
not recognise in its foreign policies and in Western media. If we a% end more closely 
into Al-Qaida’s historical development, violent jihadism has been situated in Cold 
War period when US administration facilitated, precisely say, promoted offi  cially the 
moslems resistance againt Soviet invasion in Afganistan since 1979 onward. For US, 
this resistance was taken as proxy in its covert war againts communist superpower. 
Discussion about American involvement in producing Islamist Jihadism since Reagan 
up to Obama adminstraation, see Michel Chossudovsky, America’s ‘War on Terrorism 
(2005); see also Chossudovsky, 9/11 Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and the Soviet-
Afghan War to George W Bush and September 11, 2001 (Global Research, 9 September 
2010).
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homicidal perverts. Sources of terrorism, this violet yet unjust act, are out 
there, in hiding places including in their minds and hearts.5
Inspecting the Oriental Specters
Another way to come to terms with the shi$ ing notion of terrorism, 
from political into religious-cultural, is by drawing our a% ention more 
closely to  the lack of conceptual clarity in the defi nition of international 
terrorism. Such lack not only characterizes various conceptualization of 
terrorism among political scholars on political violence and other scholars 
whose arguments seek to confl ate violence, radicalism and terrorism 
altogether, but most unfortunately, has for almost four decades since 1970s 
marked in insidous ways how US, Western states, authoritarian regimes 
in Middle East, and to lesser extent, Southeast Asian countries have 
employed this term for pursuing their respective interests or mobilized 
it as conceptual apparatus readily available to contain either communist 
insurgent or, more recently, political Islamists in post-Cold War period. 
Far beneath the discursive surface of liberal security-welfare nexus, 
Islam occupies the place of communism, a discursive space of ideology 
within which terrorism, this empty signifi er, begins to function as image 
of chaos, diorder and inhumanity altogether. Noam Chomsky (2003:211), 
the most insistent critic of US foreign policy in the Middle East, argues 
a$ er fairly long study on America’s quest for global dominance that this 
self-declaring democracy has been thoroughly consistent in shaping 
and reshaping international enemy. A$ er 1989, Islam—as religion and 
community—has been made the best candidate of all as post Cold War 
‘international enemy’. At this point, terrorism is the only concept that 
political vocabulary of liberal power has kept intact from any defi nite 
5 Millitary a% acks and the working of detention centers in post 9/11 are two articulations 
of such assumption within global counter-terrorism framework, that evil intention 
resides in community, perceived as breeding ground, and keeps locked in human 
minds. Guantanamo’s detention center, including Abu Gharaib in Iraq, is the place 
where supposed terrorist and those linked to Al-Qaida have been arrested without 
fair trials and tortured as to ge% ing ‘confi dential’ infos on Al-Qaida and Osama bin 
Laden. Heated debate on the presence of the center is discussed among scholars 
drawing on human rights and international laws perspectives. One of the criticism of 
the torture practice is that “while terrorism is being practiced by the weak, torture has 
our a% ention that it is being practiced by the strong” (Lee, 2007).
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substance or force. It continues its adventure with Islam in the baggage, to 
requote Chomsky in International Terrorism: Image and Reality,  “as concept 
to be exploited in the service of power” (1991: 69).     
To fi rmly asserting the discursive formation of this specters, or 
non-sovereign threats, discourse on terrorism has passsed through two 
international debates in United Nations in 1970s and early 2000s. In his 
fact-investigating article Defi ning International Public Enemy (2006: 69-
91), Jorg Friedrich summarizes how the debates revolved around the 
precise defi nition of terrorism as to fully inform the Dra$  Convention on 
International Terrorism. In the First debate (1972-1979) particularly a$ er 
Munich Incident in September 1972, most of the post-colonial African and 
Asian countries strongly objected the proposal of US, British and Israel. 
Post-colonial countries seemed to realize how terrorism as defi ned by the 
three states was the last scenario of the almost dying colonializing powers. 
Their proposed defi nition targe% ed  insurgents or self-determination 
movement as terrorist groups. Until 1979, the consensus remained out 
of sight though Ad Hoc Commi% e on International Terrorism has been 
established through Security Council Resolution in 1973. 
On the contrary, Second debate in early 2000s, particularly a$ er 
9/11, almost all countries were in agreement that ‘terrorism’ is their 
common enemy. But consensus remained fairly una% ainable given that 
the states share diff erent interests in preoccupying with, or making use of 
this term. One of their point of diff erence concerned the status of Hamas 
in Palestine-Israel confl ict. Though investing their interest in terrorism as 
means to containing insurgensies at home, most of the African and Middle 
East states were well aware of superpowers’ interests and proposed more 
abounded defi nition of terrorism capable of restricting US and Western 
states’ conduct that might violate their sovereingty.  
It is in the Second debate that US and Western powers a% empted to 
avoid the more precise defi nition of terrorism. Why? Ma% ers concerning 
the profi ling might to be too risky for the superpowers since if the dra$  
convention off ers rather clear-cut defi nition of who or which organization 
and which acts fall into terrorism, it might restrict the possible extending 
use of the term to capture other threathening forces to Western interests 
in Asia, Africa and South America regions. The lack of consensus over 
defi nition of terrorism benefi ts not only US and Western countries whose 
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imperialist foreign policy is in desperate search for bypassing other’s state 
sovereignty but also those post-colononial regimes in the three regions, 
particularly Middle East, whose internal repression at home againts 
political Islamist becomes increasingly legitimate through the constant 
deployment of terrorist labelling. 
The lack of consensus in fact masks imperialists interests to the 
extent that such lack facilitates, if not prompting, the emergence of two 
non-democratic trends in international arena. First, USA and its supporters 
defi nes terrorism in line with functional extrapolation model (Lee, 2007:137-
153). With this model at its disposal, the state, especially USA and its ‘War 
on Terrorism’, has been made possible to extrapolate set of criteria or 
articles from sixteen international convenants in order to justify its arbitrary 
defi nition or labelling of other ‘threatening forces’ abroad as terrorists.6 It 
then follows that by infl uencing members of Security Council, series of 
resulted SC resolutions have justifi ed the unilateral and also multilateral 
intervention in the universalizing name of ‘international community’.7 The 
factual determination of which organization or community is terrorist with 
6 There are 16 international conventions from which US and Western states defi ne 
terrorism  on case-by-case basis. Many other countries also use these conventions 
in their legislation as to enforce laws againts domestic-transnational terrorism. The 
conventions are as follow:   Aircra$  Convention 1969; Unlawful Seizure Convention 
1971; Civil Aviation Convention 1973; Diplomatic Agents Covention 1977; Hostage 
Taking Convention 1983; Nuclear Material Convention 1987; Amendments to the 
Nuclear Material Convention 2005; Airport Protocol 1989; Maritime Convention 1992; 
Protocol to the Maritime Convention 2005; Fixed Platform Protocol 1992; Protocol to 
the Protocol on Fixed Platform; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Detection 1998; Terrorist Bombing Convention 2001; Terrorist Financing 
Convention 2002; Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2007.
7 The following is the defi nition of terrorism as explicated in SC’s resolution 2004 (S/
RES/1566/2004). Compared to other resolutions, this defi nition is more clear-cu% ing: 
terrorism is “criminal acts, including againts civilians, commi% ed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostage, with the purpose to provoke a state 
of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons,  intimidate 
a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act, which constitute off ences within the scope of and as defi ned in the 
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances 
justifi able by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious 
or other similar nature, and calls upon all states to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, 
to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature”.
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all its supposed networks and supporting community works through on 
case-by-case basis formula. It is when members of SC are in full agreement 
on the causes of War on Terrorism (Jus ad Bellum) and practical principle 
of waging the War (Jus in Bello) we soon witness, as few times happened, 
harsh military a% acks on Middle East and Moslem communities have been 
carried out in the name of either preventive intervention or humanitarian 
intervention.     
Second, warfare becomes the rule of international law. This has its 
recent origin in what we already delineated above. Not only American 
exeptionalism as students in IR know very well but the fact that amid the 
lack of consensus and specifi c charaterististics of post Cold War order, 
the War on Terrorism reveals more blatantly how moral imperialism of 
liberalism has taken the bloody face of war. Andrepuolos (2011:98-86), for 
instance, argues that instead of war as last resort, it is through hegemonic 
discourse on terrorism that the war begins to be best channeling of moral 
fantasy and ideological supremacy of (neo) liberalism. War is thought as 
the price of peace that never lasts. War and moral is thought as not be in 
confl ict to each other as their connection has arguably been, and will be in 
sustained refi nement through Just War Doctrine.    
This doctrine occupies crucial position in current discourse on 
terrorism since it provides moral grounding of military intervention war 
on terrorism in terms of causes and procedures of waging the war. It is 
our contention that it promotes war with its underlying assumptions that 
streching between realism and pacifi sm in making senses of the world 
order. Cloaked in liberal humanism rhetoric, the doctrine centres its 
practical validity upon the notion of legitimacy and sovereignty. The most 
leading proponent, Michel Walzer (2006:3-12) evokes a bold statement: 
“all terrorists are murderers but not  all murderers are terrorists”. 
Though he defends that state can commit terrorism insofar as it does not 
follow suit the principles of Just War, his arguments do not fully engage 
with the reality of internasional politics in which the states, particularly 
superpowers positing UN’s Security Counsil, have been previleged to 
profi ling certain acts and groups as terrorist. In order not to fall into 
terrorism, the state must conform with principles of Just War where the 
terrorists do not comply. It is also argued that in waging the war, terrorist 
knows no collateral damage while the state targets defi nite enemy. This 
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doctrine implies that current terrorist acts, which are perceived as religious 
and non-political, kill civilians or non-combatants. 
Maneuver of Just War doctrine draws growing criticism that sees 
it as completely a liberal license to kill. Againtz Walzer, Virginia Held, in 
Terrorism and War  (2004: 59-75), argues that “war can be morally wrong 
than terrorism’. The strongest point of her arguments is that, drawing 
upon historical evidence of modern terrorist acts, terrorism has been 
the language of change, be it societal revolution or political reformation. 
Political nature of modern terrorism, including Al-Qaida, in contrast, 
seeks to reshape more just and equal world order. Counter-terrorism 
is seen as a% empt at preventing such change for which the labelled 
terrorists desperately struggle. Consequently,  using terrorist violence 
to bring about change is not inherently worse from moral point of view 
than using violence to prevent such change (counter-terrorist acts).  It 
implies that terrorist violence is completely evil in religious-liberal terms 
but necessary evil in political terms. It is also the case that victims of the 
acts are not innocent civilians but selectively targe% ed whose political 
consent, be it by commision or by ommission, have made possible for the 
government to issue unjust public policy at home or imperialist foreign 
policy abroad. 
 It then becomes undoubtedly clear how contemporary tranfor-
mation of the rule of war into rule of law in international politics se% ing 
places war as legal activity while terrorism is not. Violence is the essence 
of the terrorism while violence of the counter-terrorism is ma% er of war 
misconduct. Terrorist violence is perceived as having nothing to do with 
politics but completely with religious zeal of ‘radical’ Moslem that knows 
no dialoque or negotiation. This renders possible the mainstreaming of 
liberal understanding of violence in which violence exclude from political 
arena and being confi ned into domain of war (Asad, 2007:17). The task of 
liberal states is, by implication, to abolish terrorists and make their voice 
voiceless. Criticising U.S intervention in Sudan in 1994, Mamdani exposes 
us into hidden truth of liberal state’s  maneuver, that is, humanitarian 
intervention is cloaked war, “humanitarian intervention is not antidote 
to international power but its latest product... when the law is applied 
selectively, the result is not the rule of law but the subordination of law to 
the dictates o power’” (2009, 282-284). 
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Non-democratic trends in international politics bring us closer to 
what is actually going on within the discourse on terrorism. Beside the 
fact that violence of terrorist’s act, as defi ned by SC Resolution, remains at 
the heart of the international debate, moral-ideological overdetermination 
is evidently present even in scale and in such a depth unprecedented. 
Though scholars on political violence have sought to redefi ne violence 
as the core component of terrorism (Mockaitis, 2007:3-8), such eff ort 
cannot distract our a% ention to how particular moral-ideological doctrine 
regulates  international politics  and conducts of war againts what has 
been labelled as terrorists, or public international enemy. As we already 
discusssed, the enemy in question is not the enemy without discursive 
intervention in the sense that it exists within discursive understanding 
in international politics and academics world as well. Acts of profi ling 
certain groups or networks that commit violence, particularly homicide, 
is not the privelege of international politics but also the habits of scholars 
on terrorism whose basic assumption of violence and humanity needs to 
be brought into our constant vigilance. This is to be well informed with 
what Chomsky suggests that concerning ‘terrorism’ we have to be able to 
distinguish literal terrorism, that is, the acts of terror from propagandist 
terrorism of post 9/11 campaign which exploits issues of justice and 
security in favor of liberal humanism and nationalism cum fascism.      
Historical evidence of how Islam has been transformed into 
serious ma% ers of international aff airs since Iran Revolution in 1979 needs 
no further discussion here. What concerns us is the fact that by rereading 
the relation between Islam and Terrorism within the underlying logics of 
‘War on Terrorism’, we are able to capture how threat is actually required 
as to eff ace sense of security and moral-liberal supremacy in post Cold 
War period. Full-scale atrocity of  WTC explosion together with the huge 
number of dead has paved the way toward ‘policing the human’ rather 
than ‘policing the states’. Againts common sense, the inclusion of Islam 
into international specters has taken place far back in times rather than 
moulded in the event. War on Terrorism, offi  cially declared next day a$ er 
the event, reaccentuates, if not to reassure in strongest imperalist tone, 
that ‘our enemy’ is out there and Americans  must take action for justice. 
If we take Bush’s declaration including other Western’s leaders’ statements 
Frans Fikki Djalong, Reorientalising Islam: Terrorism and Discourse on Evil
259
a$ er the event into critical scuritiny, Islam, this supposed enemy, has now 
been wearing terrorist cloths rather than terrorist wearing Islamic cloths.  
The imperialist urge for hegemonizing its political principles and 
moral conduct of human co-existence throw liberal states into the constant 
state of emergency. It is with the War on Terrorism, liberal politics of 
banalization againts diff erent sets of ideas and practices of conducting 
human aff airs operates in the name of humanitarianism and global 
security (Negri, 2000:12-13). The forced presence of Islam as metaphor 
of actual and latent threat to liberal imagining in fact renders the War to 
acquire global rather than international dimension. Rhetorics of the war 
sounds too loudly that nowadays it is not the state but the human security 
at stake. Sense of indiscriminate killings is provoked in books, journals and 
mass media while in fact the perpetrators , as listed by the states’ agencies, 
commi% ed violence in purpose—instrumental violence (Jenkins, 2003:1-
16).8 This cra$ ed sense of terror has been rapidly reproduced through 
New York Times, Foreign Policy, Washington Post, CNN, to take the 
best representative of others, and hundreds of provoking but doctrinal 
scholarly books on terrorism in post 9/11 period. 
As widely accepted, the terms, Religious Terrorism, almost 
entirely imprints its hegemonic assumstion about Islam with far reaching 
excesses  including the most notorious project of deradicalization and 
disengagement. Contrary to offi  cial propaganda that War on Terrorism-
Deradicalization is to rehabilitate ‘radical Moslems’ from violent 
propensity, this discourse have sought to ensure that Islam, particulary 
political Islam, has been at perpetual confl ict with liberal political-moral 
doctrine. Labelling such as radical Moslem Islam, political Islam and 
Islamist to wahabism and salafi sm for intance, to name the widely used 
terms, is not value-free. As we will discuss in next section, this labelling, the 
act of naming, reveals convincingly moral evaluation of political reality in 
8 Worth adding here is the fact one of the possible ways to get the sense of terror globalized 
is by exaggerating potential threat of WMD or the use of it in the unforeseable future. 
In post 9/11, books and media reports discuss at length the possibility of ‘Islamist 
Terrorists’ using nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. A% acks on Al-Qaida bases 
in Afganistan in 2001 up to 2011 have been based, beside looking for Osama bin Laden, 
on this cra$ ed fear of potential use of WMD. In terms of international laws, the a% acks 
fall into preventive intervention. It is also the case for the military invasion in Iraq in 
2003.
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which struggles for justice and freedom from imperialist intervention are 
de-islamized and politics must get rid of religion. Both ‘islamization of 
politics’ and ‘politicization of islam’ are two sides of a liberal coin, forging 
an understanding of the connection between religion and politics. To sum 
up, in our treatment, the labelling deserves critical inspection since in fact 
it does not truly tell us the reality it claims to represent but worse, such 
labelling erases political dimension of terrorism and the worst, promotes 
the making of radical subject it seeks to negate at all cost through exhausting 
war- legal enforcement and ideological intervention—deradicalization.9
Re-orientalising Islam
Preceded with the contextualising of discourse on terrorism as 
religious evil in academic debate and international politics, we now pursue 
our stricter explanation into ideological eff acement of orientalism. Though, 
we know well both academic and international politics reorientalise Islam 
by employing the language-games, be it legal or moral, that incite broad 
public consensus and capable at almost all levels to mobilise war’s support 
and hysteria. Rereading contemporary Islam through our restored critique 
of orientalism serves to make sense of how at the heart of the discourse 
lies ideological installations of power-relations. We can no longer deny 
that ‘moslem’, this religious a% ribute of human identifi cation, enlives 
the paradoxes of the discourse to the extent that it has multiple use for 
diff erent regimes of political cra$ ing. It is today, precisely following 9/11 
event, liberal fundamentalism has reinvented our notion of identity as we 
cultivate identity-diff erence, in ma% ers of social and political aff airs, that 
accords within liberal frame.
At quick glance, status of Islam in post 9/11 discourse on terrorism 
seems fairly ambivalent. On the one side, it is taken for granted that as 
religion it promotes peace instead of violence. while on the other side, 
9 There are ample discussions on characteristics and types of  intervention/measure 
againts national-international terrorism. Terente (2002:5) summarizes them into law of 
war framework and legal enforcement framework. In common use, there are hard approach 
and so$  approach. Another Scholar, Wilkinson  (2001:49-102), notes three models of 
intervension/measures againts national-international terrorism since a$ er World War 
II onward. First, diplomacy approach or political negotiation within peace process 
framework. Second, legislation approach and legal enforcement. Third, military 
approach or war on terrorism.
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Islam is kept in sustained surveilance as various ideological interventions 
are deployed as procedures and technics for liberating, or be% er say, 
‘civilizing’ moslems from temptation to take up violent conducts in dealing 
with social and political problems. This ambivalence is too apparent if we 
take a closer inspection at how global project of de-radicalization stems 
its assumption and prescribtion from both Huntingtonian doctrines of 
post Cold-War politics and the seemingly unquestioned set of analyses 
provided by proponents of religious terrorism-fourth wave among small 
but too powerful circle of American and European scholars. It is in books 
and politics that once again we witness Islam, this faith and community, 
becomes object of speech, control and specifi c treatment. Since 2007 
onward, integrated eff orts to relate Islam and violence has been in 
place with full scale and intensity.10 But this time moslems themselves, 
particularly scholars, intellectuals and de-radicalization practitioners, 
take the leading role in promoting this scenario of liberal power.    
Centuries of colonialism are not too distant for human memory to 
recollect historical pieces of human subjugation in the name of modernity 
and modernization. Taking the most recent instance, Palestinian experience 
of loss, which triggering violent urge for independence, has been blocked 
from ge% ing globalized not only in terms of publications and reports 
but also being emptied from the conceptual apparatuses liberal scholars 
employed to make sense of their cases (Said, 1978:3-11). The terms terroris 
is used by Israel governments and Western Media to describe any acts of 
resistence commited by intifadists and Hamas. The notion of conceptual 
apparatus includes sets of institutions, rules, media and political supports 
that all, by design or by implication, aim at representing objects of its 
encounter and intervention. Not diff erent from Bush who states that 
moslem terrorists are incarnation of evil, Benyamin Netanyahu (1986:29-
10 Orchestrated eff orts at ‘deradicalizing’ Moslem subjects and its ‘violent culture’ have 
begun in 2007 onward as such eff orts reintegrates into US foreign policy in North Africa, 
Middle East and Southern  Asia regions. As global project  issue of deradicalization 
emerged within American public around the year when the public felt that the 
invasions into Afganistan and Iraq made Americans far more insecure at home. It also 
aff ected scholarly works and research orientation toward fi nding out ‘root causes’ of 
terrorism in terms of surplus-defi cit democracy, authoritarianism, failed state, eff ects 
of globalization and culture of violence.
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30) used terrorism to describe palestinian moslems in his words, terrorism 
is “a new breed of man which takes humanity back to the prehistoric 
times, to the time when morality was not yet born’.      
In Orientalism Reconsidered (1985), Said reiterates the urgency of 
criticising the power-knowledge nexus in producing facts and common 
sense about religion, race, and ethnic. In his article Palestine in Mind of 
the West, he writes the following:   
“..As a designation made in Europe, the “Orient” for many 
centuries represented a special mentality, as in the phrase “the 
Oriental mind,” and also a set of special cultural, political, 
and even racial characteristics (in such notions as the Oriental 
despot, Oriental sensuality, splendor, inscrutability). But mainly 
the Orient represented for Europe a kind of indiscriminate gen? 
erality associated not only with diff erence and otherness, but with 
the vast spaces, the undiff erentiated masses of mostly colored 
people, and the romance, exotic locales, mystery of “the marvels 
of the East.” Anyone familiar with the political history of the late 
Victorian period, however, will know that the vexing, mostly 
political “Eastern Question” as it was called tended then to replace 
“the Orient” as a subject of concern..” (1978: 3)  
The point that Said stresses is that Islam is one of the name that fi ts 
orientalist’s mental map since centuries of colonialism.11 Historically tracing, 
American power, which has taken over Britain orientalism since 1945, 
reeff aces the imperialist legacy in full blown military scale and dogmatic  
intensity. Even before, Roosevelt in 1907 had been the ultimate racist 
and cultural imperialist in his words, “it is impossible to expect moral, 
intellectual and material well-being where Mohammedanism is supreme” 
(Li% le, 2002:15). Liberal white ranks at the top of the race while Arabians, 
including African and Asian, placed nearer to the lowest bo% om. Not only 
enlightenment bias that purports ‘reason’ to win over oriental ‘sentiment’, 
American power steadily recultivates deep-seated promoteanism that 
liberal whites have to rescue the moslems from tempting recourse to 
11 For complete reading on how Islam is constructed as ‘orient’, see Edward Said, 
Covering Islam: How the Media and Its Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the 
World. New York : Pantheon, 1981; Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Kno$ , 
1993.
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tribalism and warfare in politics including mysticism in their religious 
aff airs. In post-colonial context, moslems, vast majority of Arabians and 
Africans, are strangely perceived as white men’s burden. 
Imperialist power since colonial time has intimately engaged 
with making and remaking of identity, or in other words, dwelled 
in the course of how to construct other so as to facilitate and cover up 
economic exploitation and political control over territory and resources. 
It is, then, instructive for us to see how if in the 1990s  Africa are labelled 
or housed with ‘tribalism’ that is arguably responsible for inter-etnic 
violence, Arabian Middle East in 2000s are labelled with terrorism that is 
equally in full responsibility for globalized jihadism. These two terms are 
employed by liberal fundamentalism to defi ne the connection between 
identity and violence where the violence is treated as excess of the 
identity. ‘Tribalization’ of post-colonial African politics and ‘religiozation’ 
of post 9/11 Arabian resistance, in contrast, are ideological narrative 
throuh academic works and liberal state’s policy with twofold objective. 
First, to restrict the broader and deeper issue of violence into discussion 
of perpetrators and victims. Second, to disentangle former colonial states 
from recognizing their centuries of tribalizing Africans  and decades of 
radicalizing Arabians. 
Drawing upon extending historical study of European colonialism 
in Africa, Mahmood Mamdani (1996), for instance, makes clearer that there 
was no tribal politics among African before the colonialist stepped into the 
continent, but instead colonialism practices have produced African co-
existence according to tribal lines that distinguished in rank between the 
citizen, the native and the indigenious—colonialist model of indirect rule. 
Equally applicable is the fact that American involvement in Middle East 
since 1945 has shaped political contours of the regions. Its rampant search 
for oil wells, necessary combined for Marshall Plan to restore Europe from 
total ruin and its domestic industry, has until today promoted autocratic 
regimes at the expense of throwing the regions into endless military coup 
and the masses facing repressions and exclusions. This two phenomena 
of imperialist exercise off er us clues to capture how Western power, by 
neglecting their own historical record, rehistorise contemprary Arabians 
in ‘pre-and-a$ er’ colonialism while with the same move, dehistorise their 
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imperialist presence that capable of bestowing their today’s intervention 
as benevolent and democratic tutelage.   
Dehistorizing here means depoliticising of Western Power’s active 
involvement, a hegemonic process through which their bloody encounter 
is perceived as disinterested eff orts at enlightening and modernising 
Arabians and Africans. This ideological manuver seeks to constructing 
set of knowledge and common sense that violence that has for decades 
characterised Middle East has nothing to do with colonialist-imperialist 
practises with their far-reaching eff ects on how moslems relate to each other 
and also perceive the West. Violence, insofar as excluded from political-
historical questions, belongs to domain of ‘Islamic culture’ that fails to 
comply with Western ‘peace culture’ through working of democracy and 
development—two leading discourses of liberal fundamentalism. Islam, 
understood as cultural site, is perceived as stumbling blocks for people in 
the region to welfare and democratic life. The worst, this religion comes 
to be conceived of as ideological source of dehumanization and homicide. 
Political repression commited by autocratic regimes and phenomena of 
suicide bombing in the late 1990s have set up symbolic and intrepretive 
conditionings that ‘validate’ this liberal fallacy that religion is the source 
of violence. in eff ect, it rehaspes Western public opinion and wortst, 
compels foreign policy of Western power in dealing with Middle East 
politics, particularly the connection between Islam and politics.    
It is a$ er Cold War ended in early 1990s orientalist agenda has 
transformed ideologically from issue of westernizing the regions in 
terms economic development into reforming the moslem culture in terms 
of human rights and global security. The notion of violence reemerges 
togehter with the shi$ ing emphasis from ‘backardness’ of Arabian 
societies into ‘violent cultures’ of mohammedism. The transformation 
locates Islam at the centre of global concern, particularly American 
foreign policy. It awaits not too long until the bombing of World Trade 
Center in 2001 that the questions of the relation between Islam, politics 
and violence begin to take liberal ways of understanding. One of central 
assumption is that to make sense of terrorist acts one needs to relate it 
to religion for which the terrorists claimed to serve rather than political 
context that breeds sense of humiliation and anger (Held, 2004:59-75a). 
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Insofar as their acts are perceived as evil, it follows that such inhumanity 
springs from totalitarian ideological source.      
In post 9/11, discourse on terrorism transforms Islam from 
religious experience into political category (Mamdani,2002:766-775). This 
transformation is mediated through the employment of the term radicalism 
whose defi ning features laden with liberal assumptions of order and 
agency.12 When Islam turns into political category to address the question 
of whether it is radical or not radical in nature and practical excess, it 
is no longer found the need to distinguish terrorist from non-terrorist, 
but good muslims from bad muslims. Current result is that Islam must 
be ‘quarantined’ and ‘devil’ in it must be ‘exorcised’. This new discourse 
opens up civil war between good and bad moslems in forms of continued 
and tenser confl ict of interpretation of Jihad at the service of global security 
and USA domestic security. This all made possible when terrorism falls 
into culture talk rather than political questiongs of its emergence, confl ict 
context and its adversary—the Wester Power. Within the discourse vast 
number of ‘moderate’ moslems no longer recognise US, particularly its 
foreign policy, as adversary of the labelled ‘terrorist groups-and-radical 
Islamist movements’.  Terrorist acts and terrorism begin to be understood 
integral to Islam rather than as modern construction, a historical product 
of Cold-War and politically cra$ ed discourse of superpower manuever in 
global politics.
Being treated as political category does not necessarirly mean that 
Islam is understood as ethic-political articulation of moslem communities. 
In contrast, Islam, as confl ated with terror, becomes depolitized to the 
extent that its ideological status serves as First, epistemological object of 
modern liberal society and Second, governmental object of liberal political 
surveillance (Asad, 2007: 7-38). It follows that in order to contain, if not 
12 Meaning of radicalism is context-based and succumbs to political interests and 
objectives.  In current use, radicalization is to explain what is going on before the bomb 
explodes or paths ‘radical’ moslem undertakes before turning into suicide bomber.  In 
Concept of Radicalization as Source of Confusion (2010: 479–494), Mark Sedgwick, for 
instance, argues that in post 9/11 the meaning and usage of the term radicalism have at 
least three contexts: security context, integration context and foreign policy context. US 
employs the terms in service of its security and foreign policy abroad particularly in 
Middle East while European countries exploit the terms to coping with the problems 
of Moslem immigrants and their encounter with European national cultures.
Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Vol. 14, Nomor 2, November 2010
266
completely demolish this Islam-incited ‘terror’, Western power do no have 
at its disposal eff ective means but takes recourse to moslems themselves 
who fantasise the West as tolerant and properous. Since 9/11, the making 
of ‘moderate’ moslems (theologians, scholars and public intellectuals) 
has taken place in rather similar ways as characterising the last decades 
of producing developmentalist-security liberal apparatusses in Middle 
East and other regions outside Western hemisphere. Lurking behind this 
seemingly benevolent project of promoting peace in moslem societies has 
been the sustained eff ort to produce secularist moslems whose agency 
has less to do with criticising US foreign policy and interventions than 
to  naming and blaming their fellow moslems as terrorist, Islamist and 
radicals. Even in eff ects, these secularist moslems, well-armed with liberal 
concepts of politics and identity, “promote policies and changes in Moslem 
societies that synchronise wiith US goals and strategic communication 
(Zuhur 2008:12-13). This agency now learns to ask question of violence 
in cultural-religious terms rather than disclosing its political spectrality. 
Terrorist act, whatever global or local the repercursions of terror, is 
increasingly conceived of as ‘moslem questions’.   
It  is here that we need to reread diff erently Huntingtonian thesis 
that ‘clash of civilizations’ characterises post Cold War order (Huntington, 
1993:22-49). This sophisticated version of orientalism asserts that Islamic 
jihadism will be going to be fundamental adversary of liberal order-
--in our treatment, liberal fundamentalism. Following our preceding 
discussion, the truth of this thesis is not that it presents us facts since 
the outset but on the contrary, it has infl uenced foreign policy of the 
Western power to the extend that such policy contributes to the making 
of facts such liberal thesis has fantasised. US led counter-terrorism, 
through global war and global deradicalization project. By taking up 
Islam as its main target, discourse on terrorism creates its own reality 
(Zubaika, 2009:19-20). One decade of counter-terrorism fulfi lls truth of 
the thesis through ideological eff acement of US invasion into Afganistan 
2001-2011 and Iraq 2003. Together with deradicalization project, this 
thesis cultivates its truth through the eventualization of its promises, 
creating the already anticipated subjects of ‘radicalist moslems’ and most 
importantly, constructing an epistemological space within which certain 
ideas, knowleges, and sciences about Islam are installed while others are 
excluded or derealisable.                        
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It is only a$ er confl ating Islam with potential and actual source of 
terrorism that eff orts at reforming this religion take global underpinings. 
We are today then facing with the cra$ ed urgency of theological 
reformation in which the moderate moslesm, particularly religious 
scholars, conceived as Luther  who once reformed christianity. Marvin 
Perrin (2008), one among other liberal proponents of Islamic reformation, 
argues that Moslems can learn and take benefi t from from the secular, 
rational, and humanist outlook of the Enlightenment, which has become 
an integral part of modern Western civilization and is crucial to the 
shaping of the liberal-democratic tradition in moslem societies. This 
typical prescribtion o$ en parallels various testimony of former jihadist 
whose statements and interviews are repeatedly published and cited in 
Western media such New York Times and Washington Post. It is through 
their own words liberal fundamentalism intensifi es its war on Islam by 
using moslems as proxy. Just take a look at the words of former Jihadist 
that underpins liberal urge of what Islam and moslem should be in US-
led international order:
“Islam needs a Reformation. It needs someone with the courage 
of Martin Luther. . . .Muslims are too rigid in our adherence to 
old, literal interpretations of the Koran. It’s time for many verses—
especially those having to do with relations between Islam and 
other religions—to be reinterpreted in favor of a more modern 
Islam. It’s time to accept that God loves the faithful of all religions. 
It’s time for Muslims to question our leaders and their strict 
teachings, to reach our own understanding of the prophet’s words 
and to call for a bold renewal of our faith as a faith of goodwill, of 
peace and of light.”(Quoted from Mansour al-Nogaidan, “Losing 
My Jihadism,” Washington Post, July 22, 2007)
This statement may bear some truth for religious discussion but 
looking at deeper and broader context of its enunciations and addresse, 
it voices diff erent messege and purpose. We no longer hear the voice of 
the fi ghters for equality and justice, but that of the ‘good’ moslem who 
dictates his fellows what Islam should look like in teachings and religious 
conducts. It is within this liberal discourse on terrorism, violence a% aches 
to Islam, made indistinguisable, that makes us forget the actual interplay 
between terrorist acts and Western power politics. The dubious need for 
reforming Islam is,  however, the discourse’s latest articulation that seeks 
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to separate religion from politics in times when vast majority of moslems, 
particularly in Middle East, has suff ered from long-entreched internal 
repression, byproducts of Western power’s national interests that creates 
war abroad in service of providing peaceful welfare at home. 
When terrorist’s violence, its terror, confi nes to religous ma% ers, 
we, entrapped too deeply in this discourse, are blinded to see how such 
terror mirrors its intimate counterpart—liberal fundamentalism’s terror. 
When it succeeds as it is now, we come to take its prescribtions, like 
pills, as normal rule that regulates what we should hear and see, in other 
words, to consume and reiterate. To follow Judith Butler in his embaracing 
critique of War on Terrorism (2005:1-49) , we are now living in golden era 
of liberal absolutism within which we are alluded to perceive some live 
are grievable while others are not, some deaths worth public mourning 
while other worth public curse and celebration. The point is that when 
we fail to understand the intimate relation between violent jihadism and 
liberal fundamentalism, we also fail to make sense of the connection 
between jihadist’s Holy War and Western power’s Just War. Such failure 
has been what is desirable for liberal fundamentalism that now seeks 
multiple ways for the persistence of its imperial power. 
 
Conluding Remarks
The overall discussion above serves to explain how current 
disourse on terrorism brings together terrorist’ acts, violence and Islam 
into the generalized term terrorism. Reinsertion of Islam as explanatory 
power and epistemological object of the discourse  tells us orientalist’s 
vision of politics both in terms of global order or regional-domestic aff airs 
particularly in the Middle East. It operates through scholarly works, 
international debates in United Nations, and most recently, channelled 
through the globalising project of deradicalization. What do all these 
imply for us? The following are three modest suggestions to help cope 
with global scale terrorism and current phenomena of ‘religious’ violence 
at our own home in Indonesia. 
First, we need to distinguish terrorist act from terrorism. Drawing 
upon ample historical studies on political violence, acts of terror are 
purposive despite of the fact current terrorist acts eff ace religious 
doctrines. Violent Jihadism needs not blind us to take up essentialist 
Frans Fikki Djalong, Reorientalising Islam: Terrorism and Discourse on Evil
269
view that ideology drives action or precedes the acts. In constrast, it is 
through acting out, commiting violence, that jihadism is actively eff aced. 
This understanding is instructive since it rescues us from following the 
liberalist footsteps that idea is in full control of human behaviors. It is 
to run counter current discourse on terrorism that defi nes terrorism as 
ultimate violence while leaving no room for political questionings of 
the acts. Second, consequently, we need to discuss terrorist violence in 
broader context of its emergence and usage. Though, various defi nition 
of terrorism explicates that terrorist act is to achieve political-ideological 
goals, current discourse on terrorism, particularly scholars of ‘religious 
terrorism’ redefi ne terrorist’s political goals as completely una% ainable, 
or trancendentalist. This understanding of terrorist’s goals paves ways to 
the arbitrary use of ‘radicalism’ as concept as well labelling those who 
employ terrorist acts as againts liberal democracy and human rights. 
Third, we are of course againt terrorist’s  violence, particularly 
homicide, but pu% ing the wrong questions will necessarily result in wrong 
answers and worse, contributes in promoting liberal fundamentalism 
that now makes this discourse more bleeding than ever as currently 
taking place in Afganistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Equally important is that 
our discussion compels us to seriously rethink our current preoccupation 
with ‘terrorism’ at home so as to preclude deradicalization project from 
functioning as part of orientalist project to demonize Islam and also to 
criticise in sustained ways our current regime’s manuever to exploit the 
term for manipulating security issues and control the labelled ‘radical’ 
moslems in favor of ultra-nationalist-facist paradigm of nation-state 
building.*****
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